Indo-Pak Relations (1965 - present)

 India and Pakistan have had a very hostile relationship since their bifurcation in 1947. The partition was driven by the Muslim League's demand for a separate nation based on religious identity, as they believed that British India consisted of two types of people: Muslims and Hindus. In response, the British divided the region, designating predominantly Hindu areas as India and predominantly Muslim areas as Pakistan. However, British India lacked demarcated religious boundaries, leading to widespread confusion, displacement, and violence. Geographically, Pakistan was divided into West Pakistan (current-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (current-day Bangladesh). The ideological divide soon turned into bloody conflict; migrants faced looting, violence, and worse atrocities, with families separated and many women taking their lives to avoid assault. Shortly after gaining independence, both countries established diplomatic ties, but tensions from the partition and disputes over princely states, most notably Jammu and Kashmir, overshadowed initial efforts at peace. India and Pakistan have since fought three major wars and one undeclared war, with two wars over the Kashmir issue and one tied to Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971. Despite efforts like the Shimla Agreement (1972), Lahore Summit (1999), Agra Summit (2001), and other peace initiatives, relations remain strained by incidents of cross-border terrorism. Nevertheless, diplomatic initiatives persist, fostering hope for a more peaceful future between the neighbouring nations.

The War of 1965

After Pakistan’s initial attempt to seize Kashmir in 1947 failed, Pakistan didn't back out. In 1965, Pakistan devised a strategy to infiltrate Kashmir with thousands of guerrilla fighters, aiming to disrupt Indian communications and incite local uprisings. In April 1965, Pakistan also skimmed in the Rann of Kutch, resulting in a ceasefire by July 1, 1965, with Pakistan gaining some territory through a UN tribunal.

Buoyed by the success in Kutch, Pakistan launched "Operation Gibraltar" in late July, sending approximately 8,000 trained guerrillas under Major General Akhtar Hussain’s command into Kashmir. However, Indian forces responded decisively, and by October, many of the infiltrators had retreated. The local population did not support the insurgents, and Indian forces secured infiltration routes at Haji Pir and Kargil.

The Haji Pir Pass was crucial for Pakistan's infiltration efforts, connecting Uri and Poonch. In August 1965, Indian forces launched an assault on the pass and, under Major RS Dayal’s leadership, managed to capture it, disrupting Pakistan's operations. Subsequently, India’s Operation Bakshi severed key infiltration routes, and Operation Faulad targeted Pakistani strongholds along the Poonch-Haji Pir route. By the end of August, Indian forces held critical positions, with many soldiers demonstrating bravery.

On September 1, 1965, Pakistan escalated the conflict with "Operation Grand Slam," aiming to capture the Chhamb-Jaurian area and the Akhnur bridge, a critical link in Kashmir’s defence. Armed with advanced U.S.-supplied military equipment, Pakistani forces initially made swift advances, but India soon countered, destroying numerous Pakistani Patton tanks and deploying air support. By September 6, Indian forces had crossed the international border into Pakistan, forcing Pakistan to bring back troops.

In the Khem Karan sector, Indian forces achieved a significant victory at the Battle of Asal Uttar, capturing or destroying many of Pakistan's tanks. The intense tank battle at Phillora near Sialkot resulted in substantial losses for Pakistan, with India capturing over 150 tanks and seizing around 180 square miles of territory.

The conflict ultimately ended through Soviet Union-brokered negotiations in Tashkent, where India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan’s President Mohammad Ayub Khan pledged to restore peace, withdraw troops, and rebuild diplomatic and economic relations. The Tashkent Agreement, signed on January 10, 1966, reaffirmed both sides’ commitment to resolving disputes peacefully and addressing broader issues, such as the repatriation of prisoners and the return of property.

The Fight for Bangladesh 

The December 1970 elections in Pakistan revealed a deep clash between East and West Pakistan. The Awami League, representing East Pakistan, won a decisive majority but was not permitted to form a government, as West Pakistan’s leadership rejected this outcome. The political crisis escalated as East Pakistan’s demand for autonomy grew, especially after years of economic and political dominance by West Pakistan’s elites.

In March 1971, the Pakistani military launched a brutal eradication of East Pakistan, leading the Awami League’s leaders to flee to India and form a provisional government, known as the Mujibnagar Government, which declared Bangladesh’s independence. The independence movement gained momentum, with Swadhin Bangla radio broadcasts rallying support.

As violence escalated, India stepped in, supporting the Mukti Bahini (Bangladeshi freedom fighters) and eventually deploying its military forces in December 1971. India's military campaign was strategic and decisive, with operations by the Indian Navy, such as "Operation Trident" and "Operation Python," crippling Pakistan's naval capabilities. These surprise attacks on Karachi effectively neutralised Pakistan's naval threat.

On land, under the command of General Sam Manekshaw and Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Arora, Indian forces advanced swiftly through East Pakistan, closing in on Dacca (Dhaka). On December 16, 1971, Pakistan’s Eastern Command, led by Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, formally surrendered to the Indian Army in Dacca, symbolizing the end of the war and the birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation. The surrender, witnessed by jubilant Bangladeshi citizens, marked one of the largest military surrenders in modern history.

In a significant diplomatic gesture, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced a unilateral ceasefire on December 17, 1971, reciprocated by Pakistan. India soon withdrew its troops from Bangladesh, honouring its commitment to the newly independent nation. In July 1972, the Shimla Agreement was signed, affirming both nations’ commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes and promoting diplomatic relations.

Operation Cactus Lily, one of the culminating military actions, saw the surrender of over 93,000 Pakistani troops. The war’s outcome challenged Pakistan’s "Two-Nation Theory," which had argued for the separation of Hindus and Muslims. The failure of this ideology was symbolized by instances such as the Mukti Bahini fighters and Pakistani soldiers, both shouting "Allah-hu-Akbar," highlighting the cultural and political divides that went beyond religion. Although the war drastically changed the regional power balance and weakened Pakistan’s military strength, the country has not entirely let go of the "Two-Nation Theory." 

The 1971 war fundamentally reshaped South Asia's political landscape, with India emerging as a dominant power and Bangladesh gaining independence. The creation of Bangladesh led to a revaluation of regional geopolitics, with India solidifying its influence. Although both countries have since made attempts at peace, numerous issues continue to challenge India-Pakistan relations today.

Nuclear Arms Race and Regional Security (1974 - 1998)

Following the 1965 and 1971 wars, India and Pakistan's suspicion and competition intensified, leading to an escalating nuclear arms race rooted in security concerns and regional rivalry. By 1998, both nations had developed nuclear weapons, significantly impacting South Asian stability.

India’s first nuclear test, "Smiling Buddha," on May 18, 1974, was a shock to Pakistan, leading to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to curb proliferation. India’s motivations were driven by regional power assertion, particularly in response to China’s nuclear tests, and the need for strategic deterrence. This test shifted South Asia's power balance, heightening Pakistan’s perception of vulnerability.

In response, Pakistan intensified its nuclear program to counter India’s capabilities. With Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s leadership, Pakistan developed uranium enrichment facilities, achieving weapons-grade capacity by the mid-1980s. Pakistan’s doctrine of “minimum credible deterrence” emerged, where ambiguity over its nuclear status served as a deterrent.

In May 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests in Pokhran, which were quickly followed by six Pakistani tests in the Chagai hills later that month, as Pakistan sought to restore strategic parity. Both countries faced international sanctions and backlash, yet their actions highlighted the need for balancing power.

The 1998 tests intensified the regional arms race, elevating fears of nuclear conflict amid unresolved Kashmir tensions. The international community raised concerns over potential escalation, urging arms control measures like confidence-building and communication hotlines. The tests also emphasized the limitations of nonproliferation efforts, as neither India nor Pakistan joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The Lahore Declaration in 1999 was a key diplomatic effort, as both nations committed to peaceful dispute resolution. However, nuclear capabilities remain central to regional security dynamics, continuing to shape the complex India-Pakistan relationship.

The Kargil Conflict (1999)

At its peak, around 4,000–5,000 soldiers from Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry infiltrated Indian territory during the Kargil conflict, withdrawing only by July 1999 due to the bravery of Indian soldiers and diplomatic pressure from the U.S. Despite many mistakes by India’s leadership, from misjudging Pakistan’s intentions to operational oversights, lower-ranking officers displayed remarkable adaptability and courage that ultimately turned the tide.

Indian soldiers fought valiantly under extreme conditions despite inadequate resources, and their efforts emphasized the need for the nation to meet their operational and welfare needs out of duty, not charity. This war also highlighted issues within India’s bureaucracy, which frequently neglected the needs of soldiers, leaving many injured veterans without support.

A year later, media, NGOs, and private businesses continued advocating for these soldiers, while the government failed to address their welfare sufficiently. Kargil was costly, though the exact financial toll remains unknown. The conflict stressed the importance of economic strength, as nations with significant resources wield greater global influence. For India and Pakistan, the focus on rivalry, instead of economic development, damages regional stability and welfare.

General Musharraf’s Kargil plan exploited gaps in India’s defences, relying on a winter buildup and the strategic positioning of Pakistani troops. Musharraf expected that India’s slow response would allow him to secure key positions along the Srinagar-Leh highway, forcing international intervention. Though Musharraf anticipated Indian complacency after the Lahore Summit, he misjudged India’s resolve once the nation mobilized.

The Air Force entered Kargil without assessing the threat, quickly losing three aircraft before revising tactics, which paid off significantly. After adjustments, success followed, as depicted by an Indian Army HQ message praising precise airstrikes that disrupted enemy command, leading to a key victory at Tiger Hill.

Operation Safed Sagar in Kargil highlighted the critical role of air support in warfare, proving that while air power alone can’t win wars, it’s indispensable. Coordinated air strikes targeting logistics and command points weakened enemy supplies, disrupted their movement and created shortages in essentials like food and ammunition, driving them to retreat.

Lessons learned include prioritising significant interdiction targets over small positions that ground forces can handle. Kargil also emphasised the need for early, joint planning with the Army, aligning air capabilities with ground strategy.

Pakistani planning was ambitious but flawed. Despite their initial success in occupying Kargil heights, Pakistan underestimated India’s response. Diplomatically, they sought to internationalise Kashmir but failed, as evidence of Pakistani Army involvement and signed maps from 1972 debunked claims about the Line of Control (LoC). By June 1999, Indian forces had reclaimed most posts, forcing Pakistan into retreat.

General Musharraf’s plan fell apart under military and diplomatic pressure, topping off in Pakistan’s retreat as Nawaz Sharif travelled to Washington. Reflecting on the defeat, Sharif admitted that Pakistan’s casualties in Kargil exceeded those in the entire 1965 conflict.

Attempts at Peace and Dialogue (2000 - 2010)

The Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) began in May 1997 when Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proposed a structured framework to address all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. Though frequently interrupted, the CDP made steady progress between 2003 and 2008.

One significant diplomatic effort during this period was the Agra Summit, held in July 2001. On July 24, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee addressed Parliament, asserting that Pakistan’s refusal to end cross-border terrorism hindered peace. He condemned Pakistan’s portrayal of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as “Jehad” and emphasised that India would continue raising this issue in all future discussions. The summit failed to produce a joint declaration, as disagreements over Kashmir and terrorism persisted. Vajpayee criticised President Musharraf’s lack of diplomatic experience and narrow, militaristic approach. He further argued that Pakistan’s insistence on Kashmir as the “core issue” ignored key historical realities, thereby stalling progress.

However, all progress under the CDP came to a standstill following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. From November 26 to 29, ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba launched a coordinated assault across Mumbai, killing 175 people (including nine attackers) and injuring over 300. The attacks shocked the global community and significantly strained India-Pakistan relations. India’s External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, even warned of possible military action against terror camps in Pakistan. The event also impacted U.S. and international relations with both countries. FBI Director Robert Mueller praised Indo-U.S. intelligence cooperation, while Interpol’s Secretary General expressed concerns over India’s failure to share critical information with global partners.

Escalating Tensions and Diplomatic Stalemate (2010 - 2019)

In 2014, Prime Minister Modi invited Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif to his inauguration, raising hopes for peace, but talks soon stalled after Pakistan's envoy met with Kashmiri separatists. Renewed efforts in 2015 included Modi’s visit to Lahore, yet relations again deteriorated in 2016 after an attack in Uri, leading India to conduct “surgical strikes" in Pakistan. Tensions escalated through 2018, peaking in the 2019 Pulwama attack, which killed 40 Indian soldiers. India responded with air strikes in Pakistan, leading to an aerial conflict. In August 2019, India revoked Article 370, ending Kashmir’s special status, further inflaming tensions with Pakistan.

The 2016 Uri attack on an Indian Army base by four Jaish-e-Mohammed militants killed 19 soldiers, marking one of the deadliest incidents in Kashmir in two decades. In retaliation, India launched the 2019 Balakot airstrike on a suspected Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Pakistan. The following day, Pakistan downed an Indian jet, capturing the pilot, while Indian fire accidentally shot down an Indian helicopter, killing six airmen. The Balakot airstrike became a significant point in India’s 2019 election campaign, bolstering the ruling party's nationalist appeal.

On February 14, 2019, a terror attack was carried out in Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir by a suicide bomber resulting in the death of 40 CRPF personnel. The suicide bomber, identified as Jaish-e-Mohammad's Adil Ahmed Dar, rammed his vehicle into a bus with the CRPF convoy. World body United Nations and countries from across the globe, including the U.S., Russia, Australia, France, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, have condemned the brutal Pulwama terror attack and extended their support to India in the fight against terrorism.

Current State of Relations (2019- current)

The U.S. has struggled to mediate India-Pakistan tensions. Efforts in the 1960s failed, but U.S. intervention during the 1999 Kargil War helped avert nuclear conflict. Closer U.S.-India defence ties and weakened U.S.-Pakistan relations, amid Pakistan’s alignment with China, have limited U.S. neutrality. China’s disputes with India in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, alongside its partnership with Pakistan through CPEC, have heightened India’s concerns about a dual-front conflict.

In 2022–2023, India tightened control in Kashmir, redrew electoral maps favouring Hindus, and held a G20 meeting in Srinagar. Targeted killings of Hindus surged, sparking protests and militarisation. At the 2023 SCO summit, India and Pakistan exchanged barbs over Kashmir, while Pakistani political instability further strained ties. A Biden- Modi statement urging Pakistan to act against extremists escalated tensions, with Pakistan rejecting India’s extradition request for Hafiz Saeed. Border violence, ceasefire breaches, and mutual accusations of terrorism deepened mistrust and instability.

India and Pakistan’s relationship remains one of the most volatile in contemporary geopolitics, marked by historical grievances, unresolved territorial disputes, and mutual mistrust. While significant efforts at peace have been made over the decades, including agreements, summits, and confidence-building measures, these have often been derailed by cross-border terrorism, political instability, and military confrontations. The advent of nuclear weapons and increasing militarization have heightened the stakes, making regional stability precarious. 

Looking forward, meaningful dialogue and a commitment to resolving core issues such as Kashmir are crucial for lasting peace. However, for such efforts to succeed, both nations must address domestic pressures, mitigate external influences, and demonstrate genuine political will to prioritize peace over conflict. Only through sustained, collaborative efforts can India and Pakistan hope to build a future of coexistence and cooperation.

For an expert perspective on this topic, I interviewed Colonel Jesus Furtado, the Commanding Officer of One Goa Battalion NCC. I was a former cadet of the battalion back in 1988. He completed his schooling at Loyola High School and graduated from Chowgule College in 1993. Here is a part of our conversation.

How does an average day in your life look like?

“Over here, as a Commanding Officer, things look relaxed when you sit on a chair, but that’s not the case as you do not become a Commanding Officer overnight. It’s a long journey. If you look at the life of a soldier or an officer, we get up every morning at 6 o'clock and go to the PT field and do PT for an hour. Then we come to to office at around 9 o’clock or so. As you become a Commanding Officer, you’re more into the office work, but there’s a lot of work that happens that is mainly in two parts: training, especially in the NCC for cadets and the normal administrative matters that are there, which are equally important. Otherwise, I feel overall as a Commander Officer of NCC battalion, things are okay and good for anyone.”

What are your hobbies?

“As a child I used to like reading. By reading, I read a lot about history and politics and never forgot to read the daily newspaper, which is what I also do today. Apart from that, I’m more of an outdoor kind of person. I love to play games and go out for treks and long walks. Like every other Goan, I would say football was my favourite game.”

What were the consequences of each of the wars between India and Pakistan?

“When you look at the wars that India has fought, India has always been a defending nation except in 1961 for Goa’s liberation when India declared war against someone. The war in 1948 was more the outcome of the partition of India that the two countries fought a bit of a bitter war. But then that led to a firm bifurcation of the country. It did take time, but in about three to four decades, India came out of being a poverty-stricken country. After fifty years, we were on the verge of becoming a developed nation and today, I believe we are a highly developed nation. In 1965, there was another Pakistani intrusion or invasion that happened. The first invasion was the Rann of Kutch. India did realise that Pakistan was not going to back track from creating disturbances in this country. From that point of view, the nation merely started getting stronger. In 1971, we saw the liberation of Bangladesh. That was more of a strategic achievement of the government of India to try and have a weaker Pakistan rather than having Pakistan on the eastern and western border. India would’ve had someone troubling her on two sides. I think we were able to achieve peace at least on one flank of our country, the eastern flank. Thereafter, we had the Kargil War that happened 28 years later (1999). Where I actively saw the Indian armed forces. Kargil led to a lot of modernisation of the Indian armed forces. It gave a big push to other economic movements and reforms that were already following up then. which has made India today a very powerful economic force in the world.”

Can you differentiate between the country’s relations before the 1965 war and after?

“In the 1965 war, what has happened was that there was an area bordering the Rann of Kutch which in those days, other than the normal fishing activities, there was an oil boom over the world. Oil exportation was on the rise, and that time, everyone was expecting the western border of India, starting right from Gujarat and going up to Rajasthan, to excel, as it’s even proven today that we do have a large number of oil reserves present there. Primarily because of that, the Pakistani side tried to make an intrusion and occupy these territories. Probably yes, there was an intent to create certain disturbances in the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir also. From that point of view, what happened followed by that was as time went on for the border fencing etc along with the Pakistani side eastern border”

What was the key military advantage of India during the fighting of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 in Bangladesh?

“The key military advantage that India had was that Pakistan was geographically divided. They had an army that was divided and had to travel a huge water channel, the Indian Ocean, from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The advantage we had was that we had the land accessible to us that they did not have access. Getting any reinforcements, etc for Pakistan was quite a Herculean task to defend Bangladesh at that point of time. That was the biggest advantage India had and the reason we were able to liberate Bangladesh.”

Can you share a few of your experiences or work-related memories?

“I will not be able to share with you something of what I haven’t been a part of, but I can tell you as my father served in the armed forces and my brother also served in the Indian Air Force as well as the Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka. I’ve heard a lot of stories in my house about the 1961 war and how the Indian army liberated Goa. After a brief one or two months of military rule, everyone they said was happy in Goa until the civil administration took over. This is what my father kept telling me, that the first two-three months of the liberation of Goa everything seemed to be disciplined and in order. The Indian army, probably the military governor, ruled Goa for a couple of months, and it was only when the civil administration took over that the chaos came. Second, my brother went to Sri Lanka and took part in a very humanitarian effort known as the bread bombing of Jaffna. The so-called Jaffna town at the time was cut off from food supply. My brother took part in the dropping of food grains to the people who were in the town of Jaffna and were being starved. In my service of almost about three decades, I’ve served in both places, the so-called troubled or disturbed areas in this country which have been notified as disturbed areas; one is Jammu and Kashmir, and the second is the northeast. What I can share with you is being directly involved in conflict. It is not easy to create an impression of people being bad. That is the first step that we should develop with people who we might be operating with in a disturbed area. We should not generalise everyone to be anti-national and inhuman. You should treat them like the citizens of your own country. Wherever I have been, I have noticed that the moment you try to display yourself as a fair and just individual, whether it is in the northeast or Jammu and Kashmir, all over, people thereafter respect you and respond to you positively.”

Do you believe the differences between the nations will ever resolve?

“Yes. I certainly hope so, and every one of us is dreaming of such a thing happening. At the end of the day, we need to live peacefully. It might take some time; you never know, but I certainly hope it happens in our lifetime. If you talk of people, as far as person-to-person contacts are concerned, you’ll realise that there’s not much of a difference between the normal civil population that lives anywhere in the country. The best example I can give you is in 2014 and now 2024, we have an exposition of St. Francis Xavier. You’ll realise there will be pilgrims who come from Pakistan too. At the level of a common citizen and a civilian, I can tell you that everyone wants to live in harmony.”

Any advice for those who want to follow in your footsteps? 

“There’s a little bit of a hesitancy on two counts. One is that the training imparted in the Indian army forces is very difficult and tough. It is just basic physical training. Nothing is impossible. A little bit of common-sense application and mental willpower is required for the physical tests. Therefore, I would advise the young generation not to suffer from that inferiority complex that the training in the armed forces is tough. The second part is that I see a lot of Goans do hesitate about the so-called risk factor or fear factor or the fear of getting killed. I think that it’s quite human and natural. Nobody is gonna say that they’re not afraid at all. Let me tell you that things are not as bad as we’re looking at it to be. When you look at the statistics, the number of soldiers and officers that get martyred is less than the number of people that die on the roads from accidents in the present-day scenario. And there’s hardly any youngsters that would say they don’t want to drive on the road.”